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Abstract
While there is substantial corruption in developing countries, the costs imposed by
corruption on individuals and households are little understood. This study examines
the relationship between exposure to local corruption and mental health, as measured
by depressive symptoms. We use two large data sets – one cross-sectional and one
panel – collected across rural Vietnam. After controlling for individual and regional
characteristics, we find strong and consistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption
is positively associated with psychological distress. Our results are robust to a variety
of specification checks. Further, we find that the relationship between corruption and
mental health is stronger for women, and that there are no heterogeneous effects by
poverty status. An examination of the underlying mechanisms shows that reductions
in income and trust associated with higher corruption may play a role. Finally, using a
difference-in-difference estimation strategy, we also provide suggestive evidence that a
recent high profile anti-corruption campaign had significant positive effects on mental
health. Overall, our findings indicate that there may be substantial psychosocial and
mental health benefits from efforts to reduce corruption and improve rural governance
structures.
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1 Introduction
Corruption is widespread in developing countries and there is universal agreement that cor-
ruption needs to be addressed to achieve inclusive economic growth (Olken and Pande, 2012).
Reflecting this concern, combating corruption is a target under the United Nations’ Sustain-
able Development Goals (SDGs). However, the gamut of costs imposed by corruption on
individuals is little understood. In this paper, we assess the relationship between petty
corruption and mental health in a developing country.
Being a victim of petty corruption can affect mental health for a variety of reasons. First, in
low-income countries, harassment bribes represent a form of regressive income tax and are
usually a non-trivial part of one’s income, especially for poorer households. For instance,
using data from the World Bank Enterprise Survey, Bai et al. (2019) find that even within
countries, smaller firms pay higher bribes as a proportion of their income. Bribes therefore
worsen economic conditions, and income loss has been shown to be detrimental to one’s
mental health (Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Christian et al., 2019).1 Second, the element of
arbitrariness and uncertainty in bribe payments (the target, frequency and size of bribe)
also creates anxiety, and can be particularly damaging for poor households.2
Third, harassment bribes induce feelings of helplessness and disenfranchisement as access
to essential services such as health, education and public administration is dictated by the
bribe-seeker who is a corrupt public official. This erodes trust in local governance and
accountability structures, and/or reduces social capital in communities, thereby worsening
mental health (Tavits, 2008). Finally, experiences of corruption may also reduce one’s returns
to labour effort through expropriation of resources, induce pessimistic beliefs about oneself,
1By worsening the supply of public goods such as access to healthcare, corruption, due to misallocation of
resources, may also lead to poorer physical and mental health (Azfar and Gurgur, 2008; Dincer and Teoman,
2019).
2Shleifer and Vishny (1993) andWei (1997) argue that the uncertainty characterizing corrupt transactions
could also be of first-order importance in deterring investment.
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and lead to adverse mental health. de Quidt and Haushofer (2019) argue that this could
also result in a ‘depression poverty trap’.
Using first-hand cross-sectional and panel data collected across rural Vietnam, we find con-
sistent evidence that day-to-day petty corruption is positively associated with psychological
distress as measured by CES-D, a standard depression index. We find that a one standard
deviation increase in corruption is associated with a 7-12 percent increase in the CES-D index
and a 20-24 percent increase in the likelihood of exhibiting severe symptoms of depression.
These results are robust to controlling for several individual and community characteristics
and a number of other checks. We also address concerns about unobserved heterogeneity
and omitted variable bias using the test outlined in Oster (2019). The main mechanisms
through which corruption appears to affect mental health are a loss of income and decline
in trust. Worryingly, we also find the negative association between corruption and mental
health to be stronger for women. We also examine the effects of anti-corruption efforts on
mental health. The Communist Party of Vietnam (CPV) General Secretary launched an un-
precedented anti-corruption campaign in 2016, which resulted in several high-profile arrests
and disciplining of government officials. Exploiting variation in exposure to corruption at
the start of the campaign, we provide suggestive evidence that this anti-corruption campaign
had positive effects on mental health.
This paper contributes to two broad strands of research. The first is the literature examining
the effects of corruption. Most studies have documented costs of corruption on economic
growth, investment, provision of public goods, and firm profitability and innovation (e.g.,
Mauro, 1995; Paunov, 2016; Reinikka and Svensson, 2004; O’Toole and Tarp, 2014). How-
ever, only a few recent studies exist that have examined the link between corruption and
mental health. Using cross-country data from Europe and Africa, these papers find a neg-
ative association between society-level and directly experienced corruption and indicators
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of mental wellbeing (Gillanders, 2016; van Deurzen, 2017).3 Our study uses individual and
household-level data from one country and allows us to control for common influences at
either the household or the village level. This is an improvement over other studies that
pool data from a variety of countries and can only control for common country-level factors,
which are not sufficiently disaggregated. This study is also the first to examine the potential
effects of anti-corruption efforts on mental health. In doing so, it contributes to a nascent
literature studying the effects of anti-corruption policies (e.g., Avis et al., 2018; Xu and Yano,
2017).
Secondly, we contribute to the emerging literature on the causes of poor mental health in
developing countries. Poor mental health and associated disorders are an important compo-
nent of the disease burden in developing countries (WHO, 2017). Those with mental health
problems are less likely to engage in the labour market and have lower labour productivity
(Frijters et al., 2014). Previous studies have found negative effects of economic shocks such
as exposure to financial crises, jobs and income loss, and lack of access to social protection
on mental health (e.g., Adhvaryu et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2013; Friedman and Thomas,
2009; Marcus, 2013). Similarly, other socioeconomic conditions such as conflict and crime
have also been found to adversely affect mental health (Dustmann and Fasani, 2016; Singhal,
2019). Studies also show that poverty or material deprivation affects cognitive bandwidth
and functioning (Mani et al., 2013; Schilbach et al., 2016). Given that government corrup-
tion is distinctly higher in poorer countries, the poverty-cognition link could be exacerbated
by corruption, thereby imposing a cost on mental health in developing countries.
Vietnam provides a relevant context for this study. Since the initiation of the Doi Moi
reforms in 1986, Vietnam has made impressive gains in economic and social well-being,
headlined by a dramatic fall in poverty (McKay et al., 2018). However, the reforms (priva-
3There is also some work showing that corruption negatively affects life satisfaction and happiness (Sule-
mana et al., 2017; Tavits, 2008).
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tization, trade liberalization, deregulation, etc.) that shifted the economy from a state-led
one to one relying on the private sector, also likely had some negative side effects. First,
the country ranks among the most corrupt and least transparent in the world. The main
forms of corruption in Vietnam are grease money to provide basic tasks or services, the
illegal privatisation of state property, and the selling of state power. The first, i.e., petty
corruption for accessing basic public goods and services, is the most dominant and visible
(Bai et al., 2019). In 2017, Vietnam was ranked 107 out of 180 countries on Transparency
International’s index of perceived corruption in the public sector and had a score well below
the average. Corruption is also an important part of the cost of doing business (Gueorguiev
and Malesky, 2012; Rand and Tarp, 2012). For instance, Gueorguiev and Malesky (2012)
show that 35 percent of Vietnamese businesses paid bribes to compete for government pro-
curement contracts, 23 percent paid bribes to expedite business registration, and 70 percent
paid bribes during customs procedures.
Second, improvements in the Vietnamese health sector have not kept pace with the needs
of the rapidly growing economy, and mental health has not been a priority area. While
prevalence of mental disorders is not estimated to be disproportionate to those in other
neighbouring countries (Vuong et al., 2011), there is unequal access to mental healthcare
services and primary care providers are inadequately trained (WHO, 2006; Giang et al.,
2010). Results of this study can help inform policy regarding the allocation of resources for
mental healthcare.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the sample and the empirical spec-
ification. Section 3 presents the main results and Section 4 describes additional analyses
of heterogeneity, underlying mechanisms, and the effects of the anti-corruption campaign.
Finally, Section 5 provides concluding remarks.
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2 Data and estimation strategy
2.1 Vietnam Social Capital Study
The first dataset was collected as part of an experimental study (Vietnam Social Capital
Study, VSCS henceforth) conducted in May-June 2017 in 56 rural communes across 22
provinces in the Red River Delta (in northern Vietnam) and Mekong River Delta (in southern
Vietnam) (see Markussen et al., 2020 for details). Figure A1 in the online Appendix depicts
the survey provinces. We obtained listings of households in the communes, and the study
team contacted the households to advertise the study and to encourage participation. Two
sessions with 12 subjects each were organized in each commune, leading to a sample of 1,344
subjects.
After the experiments, enumerators conducted individual face-to-face interviews with all
subjects to complete a post-experiment questionnaire. This collected information on back-
ground characteristics such as age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status and asset
ownership.
As part of the post-experiment questionnaire, respondents were presented with statements
to elicit individual exposure to and experiences of corruption in the public sector at the local
government level with specific reference to bribery to obtain land titles, to get a government
job, to receive medical treatment etc.4 Respondents were asked how much they agreed with
each of the six presented statements on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2
meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3 meant ‘disagree’ and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. We recode
4These statements are listed in Table A1 in the online Appendix. These statements were taken from
a summary indicator of the quality of governance titled ‘Vietnam Provincial Governance and Public Ad-
ministration Performance Index’ (PAPI). This index is constructed annually from surveys conducted across
Vietnam, to measure the performance of central and local governments in governance, public administra-
tion and public service delivery. Results from list experiments conducted to elicit people’s experiences of
corruption show trends similar to those using the battery of six statements (CECODES, VFF-CRT, RTA &
UNDP, 2019).
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responses to each statement as 1 if the subject indicates agreement (i.e., agree completely or
somewhat agree) and 0 otherwise, and then construct the individual-level corruption index
as the sum of the responses to these six statements. We standardize the corruption index
(by subtracting the mean and dividing by its standard deviation) and use that as our key
explanatory variable.
To measure mental health of the respondents, the questionnaire also included a module on
the Center for the Epidemiological Studies of Depression scale (CES-D). The original CES-D
scale consisting of 20 items was developed by Radloff (1977) as a screening tool to measure
depressive symptoms and a number of epidemiological studies show that it strongly predicts
clinical diagnoses of depression and anxiety disorders (Weissman et al., 1977). We use the
modified 10-item short-form version developed by Andresen et al. (1994).5 This version of
the CES-D has been shown to have good psychometric properties in a variety of contexts
(Andresen et al., 1994; Björgvinsson et al., 2013; Boey, 1999, Kilburn et al., 2018).
Respondents were asked to indicate how often they had certain feelings in the last week on a
0-3 scale - ‘never (0 days in a week)’, ‘sometimes (1-2 days of the week)’, ‘often (3-4 days of
the week)’, and ‘all the time (5-7 days of the week)’. A higher CES-D score reflects poorer
mental health. We use the CES-D scale to construct two dependent variables. First, we use
the composite score of the 10 questions (ranging from 0 to 30). Second, the cutoff of 10 (out
of a maximum of 30) has been recommended as an indicator for the presence of significant
depressive symptoms (Andresen et al., 1994; Björgvinsson et al., 2013; Boey, 1999). We use
this threshold to construct a dummy variable, ‘severe depressive symptoms’, that takes the
value 1 for CES-D scores greater than or equal to 10, and 0 otherwise. This latter measure
of mental health has been used widely in other studies (e.g., Angeles et al., 2019; de Quidt
and Haushofer, 2019; Singhal, 2019).
5CES-D short-form questions are provided in Table A2 in the online Appendix.
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We exclude a small number of subjects with missing responses to the depressive symptoms
module, the corruption statements, or the socioeconomic characteristics. This results in a
sample of 1,318 respondents in the VSCS.
2.2 Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey
The second data we use are the 2016 and 2018 waves of the Vietnam Access to Resources
Household Survey (VARHS hereafter). The VARHS is a long-running panel survey of almost
3,500 rural households conducted every second year since 2006 in 12 provinces across Vietnam
(see Ayala-Cantu et al., 2017 for details). Figure A2 in the online Appendix depicts the
survey provinces. Mental health is measured in the VARHS 2016 and 2018 waves using the
10-item CES-D index. The CES-D is only administered to the primary respondent of the
household, i.e., the household head or his/her spouse in most cases. With these data, we
also construct the composite CES-D index score as well as the ‘severe depressive symptoms’
dummy variable as the outcome variables.
With regards to corruption, all households that reported operating at least one non-farm
enterprise are asked how large a cost corruption imposed on their enterprise. The responses
are on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘very large’, 2 meant ‘large’, 3 meant ‘small’ and 4 meant
‘no effect’. For ease of interpretation, we construct a continuous measure of ‘corruption costs’
by reverse coding these responses to range from 0 to 3 where 0 indicates ‘no effect’ and 3
indicates ‘very large’ effects. In the regression analysis we use the standardized version of
this corruption measure as the explanatory variable.
Finally, we use a balanced panel, only keeping households that operate a household enterprise
in both rounds. This yields a sample of 956 observations across both rounds. We discuss
concerns related to attrition in Section 3.2.
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2.3 Estimation strategy
We use OLS regressions to estimate the relationship between corruption and mental health
in the VSCS data using the following equation:
Yij = α0 + α1Corrij +
K∑
l=2
αlXij + υj + εij (1)
where, Yij is the outcome measure for individual i residing in commune j. The two outcomes
are the composite CES-D score and the ‘severe depressive symptoms’ indicator, as measured
in the first dataset. The coefficient α1 captures the association between corruption expe-
riences (Corrij) and mental well-being. Xisj includes individual-level controls such as age,
gender (takes a value 1 for female), education (takes a value 1 for those who have completed
high school), marital status (takes a value 1 if married), ethnicity (takes a value 1 for the
ethnic majority Kinh), poverty status (takes a value 1 for those classified as poor by the
government), and household’s asset ownership. In addition, we include commune fixed ef-
fects (υj) to account for common factors that affect all individuals within a commune (such
as infrastructure, ethnic composition). Finally, εij corresponds to a random error term. We
allow for arbitrary correlation at the level of the commune by clustering the standard errors
at the commune level.
In the estimations above, we do not make claims of causality. While we have controlled
for all common commune-level factors and several individual-level observables, there may
be individual-level unobserved factors that could influence mental health and be related to
corruption experiences (e.g., household structure). Similarly, the OLS estimate of α1 may
also be biased due to reverse causality if respondents with poorer mental health are more
likely to recall the incidence of corruption. We attempt to reduce this bias by using the
VARHS panel data to estimate the following household fixed effects model:
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Yit = β0 + β1CCit + β2Tt +
K∑
l=3
βlXit + ηi + νit (2)
where, Yit is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i at time t. CCit is
the self-reported cost of corruption on the household enterprise at time t, and the parameter
of interest is β1. The vector Xit includes respondent characteristics such as gender (takes
a value 1 for female), age, marital status (takes a value 1 if married), education (takes a
value 1 for those who have completed primary school), poverty status (takes a value 1 if
the household is classified as poor by the government authorities), and indicator variables
to control for time-varying household exposure to the following shocks in the preceding two
years: natural disasters (floods, droughts, etc.), pest attacks, and health shocks (death or
illness of a household member). All household-specific time-invariant characteristics are
captured by the household fixed effect, ηi. By conditioning on household fixed effects, we
are only exploiting within-household variation in the burden of corruption to estimate the
relationship with mental health. Moreover, this strategy eliminates regional effects that
are unlikely to change over the two-year survey period (e.g., access to healthcare) and are
potentially correlated with both mental health and corruption. We also control for any
unobserved country-wide macroeconomic conditions at the time of the surveys using year
fixed effects (Tt). νit is an idiosyncratic error term. We cluster the standard errors at the
household-level to allow household responses to be correlated over time.
One may be concerned about the interpretation of results as both mental health and cor-
ruption measures are self-reported. First, if measurement error in the dependent variables is
random, then it will only reduce the precision of the estimates, without biasing the results.
Second, if there is random error in the explanatory variable or if there is a general tendency
to under-report corruption, then the results will be biased towards zero. Furthermore, to
the extent that the reporting bias is constant over time, the household fixed effects used in
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equation 2 would account for it. Still, measurement error could be a concern if it is correlated
with respondent characteristics. We discuss this further in Section 3.2.
3 Results
3.1 Descriptive statistics
Summary statistics of the VSCS dataset are presented in Table 1. Figure A3 in the online
Appendix presents the distribution of the CES-D scores for the analysis sample. The Cron-
bach’s α of the CES-D inventory – i.e., how closely related a set of items are as a group
– is 0.66, which indicates a reasonably high level of internal consistency. Panel A of Table
1 shows that the average score on the CES-D is 5.05 for the sample and 12 percent of the
sample exhibits severe depressive symptoms.
Panel B of Table 1 shows summary statistics for the corruption indicators, the key ex-
planatory variables. Agreement with the various indicators of corruption differs across the
measures. We find that 37 percent of the sample believes that bribes are required to get a
government job. A correspondingly high percentage of respondents believe that bribes are
required in the health and education sectors (32 and 25 percent, respectively).
Finally, Panel C shows summary statistics for the other covariates used in the analysis.6
Overall, the sample of subjects is well-balanced in terms of gender with 52 percent of sub-
jects being female. The average age is around 38 years while 81 percent were married.
Approximately 54 percent of the sample had completed high school education. On average,
6Table A3 in the online Appendix shows the means of the observed characteristics of the VSCS sample
and those of the rural population of the same 22 provinces as computed from the Vietnam Household and
Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016. We find that the two samples are quite similar though the VSCS
experiment subjects are more educated. That there is positive selection based on education into participation
in such experiments has also been shown in other work.
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households these subjects belonged to owned 9 out of 16 assets listed in the questionnaire.7
Around 8 percent of them were classified as being poor according to the government author-
ities. Ninety-three percent of the sample belonged to the Kinh majority ethnic group.8
[Table 1 about here]
Summary statistics of the VARHS data are presented in Table A4 of the online Appendix. We
find that for the balanced panel of households that operated non-farm enterprises in 2016 and
2018, mental health improved and the costs of corruption declined over time. The average
score on the CES-D declined by 22 percent from 6.94 in 2016 to 5.42 in 2018. Similarly, the
proportion of households exhibiting severe depressive symptoms fell by 38 percent from 0.26
in 2016 to 0.16 in 2018. Correspondingly, the average costs of corruption index fell 28 percent
from 0.5 to 0.36 during the same period. While prima facie, the decline in corruption costs
may have contributed to decline in the CES-D index, other factors such as a decline in the
incidence of health shocks and poverty over the same period may also have played a role in
the improvements in mental health. As discussed later in Section 4.3, the government also
started an anti-corruption campaign which may also be a contributing factor. Therefore,
to isolate the relationship between corruption and mental health, we undertake regression
analyses that allow us to control for a host of other factors.
We graphically examine the association between corruption and mental health using the
VSCS dataset in Figure 1. Figures 1A and 1B illustrate the relationship between corruption
and CES-D index and with likelihood of severe depressive symptoms respectively. Both
figures show a clear positive relationship, indicating that psychological stress increases with
7The questionnaire elicited whether households owned each of the following assets: bicycle, black
and white TV, colour TV, scooter/motorcycle/moped, landline telephone, mobile phone, electric fan, ra-
dio/stereo, pump set, refrigerator, computer/laptop, internet access, washing machine, cooler/air condi-
tioner, car/truck/van, and flush toilet.
8There are 54 officially recognized ethnic groups in Vietnam. The Kinh, the ethnic majority, constitute
around 85 per cent of the population. The ethnic minorities largely reside in the Central Highlands and the
Northern Uplands, and are therefore, slightly underrepresented in this sample.
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corruption.
[Figure 1 about here]
3.2 Regression analyses and robustness
Table 2 shows the key results of the paper using the VSCS dataset. The dependent variable
in column 1 is the CES-D index. In column 2 the dependent variable is an indicator for severe
depressive symptoms. As shown in both columns, corruption is positively and significantly
associated with the mental health index. We find that a one standard deviation increase in
the corruption index increases the CES-D score by 0.6 units, and the likelihood of severe
depressive symptoms by 2.4 percentage points. Given a sample mean of 5.02 for the CES-D
index and 12 percent for severe depressive symptoms, this translates into a 12 percent and
a 20 percent increase, respectively.
[Table 2 about here]
These results are robust to the inclusion of controls in columns 3 and 4. We also find that
females have lower mental health relative to males. This is supported by global evidence
on the female mental health penalty (WHO, 2017) and other studies in Vietnam (Giang et
al., 2010; Leggett et al., 2012). We also find that individuals from poor households report
significantly lower mental health. This is in line with a large emerging literature that finds
income losses to worsen mental health, and that cash transfers and other social security
schemes improve mental health (Angeles et al., 2019; Baird et al., 2013; Haushofer and
Shapiro, 2016).
The results in Table 2 are also robust to a number of sensitivity checks. First, we address
concerns about unobserved heterogeneity and omitted variable bias using the approach of
Oster (2019). In the lower panel of Table 2, we report δ, i.e., the ratio of selection on
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unobservables to selection on observables that would be required to fully attribute our results
to omitted variable bias. The absolute values of δ are high and exceed the cutoff value of
1 indicating that it is unlikely that unobserved factors are that much more important than
the observables included in our specification. Further, assuming that unobservables matter
as much as observables, the bias-adjusted treatment effect (β) are similar to the coefficients
in the controlled regressions (setting maximum R-squared at 1.3 times the R-squared from
the regressions that control for observables). These statistics rule out the concern that
unobservables may be driving our results.
Second, we check whether the results are driven by a particular component of the mental
health index. Results in Table A5 in the online Appendix show that exposure to corruption
is significantly related to eight of the ten components.
Third, we also check the robustness of the result to a principal component analysis of the
CES-D questions, where we retain the first component. Using the standardized value of
this component as the dependent variable, we once again find exposure to corruption to be
significantly related to lower mental health (β(s.e.) = 0.19(0.03)).
Fourth, we check if the results are sensitive to the construction of the corruption index (Table
A6 of the online Appendix). Instead of recoding the six corruption statements into binary
indicators, we use the corruption statements on the original 1-4 scale where 1 indicates
complete disagreement and 4 indicates complete agreement. The index is then formed by
summing all responses and ranges from 6-24, and then standardized. In columns 1 and 2,
we find that corruption continues to be significantly associated with poorer mental health.
It is also possible that our results are driven by some respondents who report high levels
of corruption. To check for this, we construct a corruption dummy that takes the value 1
if the respondent reports any level of agreement with any of the corruption statements and
0 otherwise. This binary measure also mitigates concerns about the endogeneity of lower
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mental health and corruption. This is because one channel of reverse causality arises from
the possibility that people with worse mental health may report a higher level of agreement
with the corruption statements than they would have otherwise. The dummy variable should
minimize this particular problem as it measures corruption experience in a binary manner.
Once again, we find that our results are robust to this reclassification of the corruption
measure (columns 3 and 4).
Fifth, we have so far assumed that all dimensions of corruption have a similar relationship
with mental stress. We now relax this assumption by considering each of the six corruption
measures individually in Tables A7 and A8 in the online Appendix. All six corruption
measures are associated with an increase in the CES-D index (Table A7). Similarly, in Table
A8 we find that 4 out of the 6 corruption measures are significantly associated with an
increase in the probability of severe depressive symptoms.
Further, we corroborate our findings using an alternative data set (VARHS) and estimation
strategy. We use a balanced panel of households that operated a household enterprise in 2016
and 2018 and apply a fixed effects model (equation 2) outlined in Section 2.3 to estimate
results exploiting within-household variation in exposure to corruption over time. The main
explanatory variable is a standardized measure of the intensity of the costs of corruption.
The results using these data and estimation strategy are reported in columns 1 and 2 of
Table 3. We find that a 1 standard deviation increase in the costs of corruption is positively
associated with a 0.45 unit increase in the CES-D index score (or a 7.2 percent increase over
the sample mean). In column 2 we find that a 1 standard deviation increase in corruption
is associated with a 5 percentage point increase in severe depressive symptoms. Given a
sample mean of 21 percent, this translates into a 23.8 percent increase. These results are
fairly similar to those noted above in Table 2.
[Table 3 about here]
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We also construct a variable that takes a value 1 if the household reports any costs of
corruption and use that as the explanatory variable in columns 3 and 4 of Table 3. These
results show that corruption reduces mental health at the extensive margin as well. Using the
Oster (2019) method mentioned above, we once again find that unobservables are unlikely
to play a role in explaining these results (lower panel of Table 3).
As a robustness check, we estimate an alternative specification allowing for non-linear province-
time trends to capture other omitted time-varying shocks and find our results continue to
hold (Table A9 in the online Appendix).9 We also check if time-varying unobservables corre-
lated with household baseline characteristics are driving the results by including interactions
of year dummies with household’s poverty status in 2016 and ethnicity as additional controls.
The results reported in Table A10 the online Appendix show that our primary results are
robust to including these terms. Together, these findings show that there is strong consistent
evidence that corruption is associated with an increase in mental stress.
As we use a balanced sample from the VARHS, one may be concerned that exposure to
corruption is related to attrition from the VARHS panel data. For example, if households
that were most exposed to corruption in 2016, either stopped operating the enterprise in
2018 or dropped out of the VARHS altogether, then we may be underestimating the true
relationship between corruption and mental health. Conditional on operating an enterprise
in 2016, we examine whether corruption is associated with attrition in 2018, using a linear
probability model. Results reported in Table A12 in the online Appendix show that attrition
either due to exit from survey or ceasing to operate an enterprise are not systematically
correlated with corruption.10
9We also check the importance of household fixed effects by replacing them with province fixed effects
in equation 2. We find that the results are qualitatively similar to those reported in Table 3 (Columns 1-4
of Table A11 in the online Appendix).
10Results using the unbalanced panel are qualitatively similar and available in columns 5-6 of Table A11
in the online Appendix.
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Finally, we discuss the issue of reporting of corruption. To the extent that the tendency to
misreport corruption is time-invariant and varies by households, this is accounted for by the
household fixed effects in equation 2. However, the reporting bias in corruption could also
be time-varying and correlated with household baseline characteristics. The results reported
in Table A10 of the online Appendix show that this is unlikely to be a concern.
Further, we saw in Table A4 that corruption had declined between 2016 and 2018. An
important change that occurred between these waves was the 2016 national anti-corruption
campaign (discussed in Section 4.3). Such a campaign could have improved the reporting of
corruption by households, even though the incidence of corruption may not have changed.
The campaign by making corruption salient could also reduce the incidence of corruption
by making public officials more reluctant to ask for bribes. Studies have found disciplining
effects of anti-corruption audits wherein such audits increase the officials’ perceived electoral
and legal costs of engaging in corruption (e.g., Avis et al., 2018; Colonelli and Prem, 2019;
Olken, 2007). Given that we notice a fall in corruption between 2016 and 2018, this implies
that even if it is the case that the campaign resulted in improved reporting of corruption,
the incidence of corruption must have declined sufficiently such that on the whole, we still
observe a decline in corruption. Once again, this suggests that our results are unlikely to be
explained by measurement error.
4 Additional Analyses
4.1 Heterogeneity
In this section, we examine if different individuals’ responses to corruption in terms of their
mental health are different. The two aspects we focus on are gender and poverty status of
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respondents. We further examine whether there are distributional effects such that individ-
uals at different parts of the mental health distribution are affected by corruption to varying
extents.
As women tend to be primary caregivers in households, they are often in the position of
seeking essential services for themselves, the young and the elderly in their families. Women’s
dependence on these public services where corruption is rife can have more debilitating
effects on them as compared to men. Further, female-owned firms are also more susceptible
to corruption and bribery (Ellis et al., 2006).11 In addition, it is possible that the gender
dummy picks up other unobserved differences (for instance, in preferences and personality)
correlated with gender. For example, gender differences in locus of control (i.e., whether
one believes one’s life outcomes are determined by their own actions or luck/fate) are an
important factor contributing to the gender gap in mental health (Churchill et al., 2020).
A more internal locus of control – wherein one believes that one’s outcomes are determined
by one’s own actions – can serve as a psychological buffer against negative external shocks
(Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016).
In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we check for differences in the relationship between corruption
and mental health by gender. We find that the effect of corruption on the CES-D index
is greater for females as compared to males (column 1) but this is not so for the severe
depressive symptoms indicator (column 2). This is consistent with other evidence that
shows that females’ mental health is more susceptible to external shocks (Dustmann and
Fasani, 2016).
[Table 4 about here]
11The 2015 Vietnam Micro, Small and Medium Enterprise Survey of 2,648 small and medium enterprises
(SMEs) shows that while 48 percent of female-led SMEs reported paying a bribe, only 40 percent of male-led
firms did so (see Brandt et al., 2016 for survey details). This gender gap is statistically significant (p− value
< 0.001).
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Next, we examine whether the mental health of individuals from poor households is dif-
ferentially affected by corruption. As noted in Section 1, corruption reduces the access of
the poor to public services such as health and education when they cannot afford to pay
bribes. Corruption also exacerbates poverty by channelling public investments from service
delivery in essential sectors toward other areas. Corruption can also compound the negative
relationship between income/wealth and mental health, as the poor may not have access
to mitigation strategies as the rich do. In columns 3 and 4 of Table 4, we find that the
poor who are more exposed to corruption have lower mental health, but the results are not
statistically significant.
[Figure 2 about here]
Finally, using the VSCS data, we examine whether there are distributional impacts such that
individuals at different points of the mental health distribution are differentially affected by
corruption. We do this by estimating quantile regressions. The estimates reported in Figure
2 show that relationship between corruption and mental health is relatively stable along the
distribution of the CES-D index. Further, we find the coefficients to be significantly smaller
compared to the OLS estimates only at the 10th percentile of the mental health distribution,
i.e., those with better mental health. The corresponding regression results are presented in
Table A13 of the online Appendix.
4.2 Examining mechanisms
We use the VARHS data to explore three pathways (household enterprise revenue, social
trust and self-belief) through which exposure to corruption may affect mental health. For
this, we use the household fixed effects model in equation 2 where we replace mental health
with the mediating variables. Thus, we exploit within household variation in exposure to
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corruption over time to identify the relationship between corruption and mental health via
various channels. Results are presented in Table 5.
First, we examine whether the relationship between corruption and mental health is mediated
by the effect of corruption on the (log) revenue of household enterprises in the preceding 12
months (in real June 2017 prices). In column 1, we find that increase in corruption is
associated with a significant decline in enterprise revenue.
[Table 5 about here]
Second, corruption may also erode trust in local institutions and/or reduce social capital
in communities (Banerjee, 2016). The VARHS asks respondents whether ‘most people are
basically honest and can be trusted’, with answers ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 4
(strongly agree), such that a higher value indicates higher levels of trust. Results in column
2 show that an increase in corruption is significantly correlated with a decline in trust.
Third, corruption, by reducing returns to one’s labour effort (via expropriation) can adversely
affect one’s belief in the ability to control one’s destiny, as proxied by locus of control.
Previous research has found a higher or more internal locus of control to be associated with
better mental health (Buddelmeyer and Powdthavee, 2016; Churchill et al., 2020). Our
measure of locus of control is constructed based on responses to four statements (‘I feel
hopeless in dealing with problems in life’; ‘what happens to me in the future mostly depends
on me’; ‘I have little control over things that happen to me’; ‘there is little I can do to
change many of the important things in my life’). Responses were on a 1-4 scale, where a
higher score indicates a more internal locus of control. We construct an index by summing
up the responses to these four statements. Results in column 3 show that an increase in
corruption is associated with a decline in locus of control, although this is not statistically
significant.
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4.3 Effects of recent anti-corruption efforts on mental health
In this section, we assess the impact of the CPV General Secretary Nguyen Phu Trong’s 2016
anti-corruption campaign on mental health using the VARHS data. The campaign resulted
in the arrests of several high-profile government officials, executives of state enterprises, and
others in the private sector (Le, 2017; Meyers, 2018). Between January 2016 and August
2018, it is estimated that 56 government officials were disciplined over corruption and 500
individuals prosecuted and sentenced in 40 corruption cases (Hoa, 2018). Several new rules
have been put in place to prevent government officials from misusing their power (Reuters,
2019). Observational reports suggest that this campaign has reduced corruption (Hoa, 2018;
Hiep, 2019).
We posit that provinces that had higher corruption prior to the campaign received relatively
greater scrutiny during the anti-corruption drive, and therefore households residing in these
provinces would potentially benefit more compared to those in provinces with lower corrup-
tion. In their study of anti-corruption crackdowns on local governments in Brazil, Colonelli
and Prem (2019) also show that audits had larger effects in more corrupt areas. We exploit
this variation in the exposure of households to use a difference-in-difference (DID) approach,
where we compare the difference in mental health of affected and unaffected households
before and after the campaign. The panel regressions take the following form:
Yipt = γ0 + γ1High corruptionp ∗ Postt + γ2Tt +
K∑
l=3
γlXipt + ηi + ωipt (3)
where Yipt is the mental health of the primary respondent in household i residing in province
p at time t, and Tt and ηi are year and household fixed effects, respectively. As the anti-
corruption efforts started in 2016, we consider 2018 to be the post-treatment period (captured
by the indicator variable Postt). High corruptionp is a dummy variable that takes the value
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1 if the average reported cost of corruption by households in the province in 2016 is above
the sample median, and 0 otherwise. The “High Corruption” dummy is time invariant and
thus absorbed by the household fixed effects (ηi) and Postt dummy is absorbed by the year
fixed effects (Tt). The coefficient on the interaction term, γ1, estimates the impact of the
campaign. We cluster the standard errors (ωipt) at the level of the province. Since we have
few clusters (12 provinces), we also report the p-values for our parameter estimates using
the wild bootstrap− t procedure (Cameron et al., 2008).
[Table 6 about here]
The results presented in Table 6 show that the anti-corruption campaign significantly im-
proved mental health. Column 1 shows that, relative to households in provinces with low
corruption, the CES-D index of household residing in high corruption provinces significantly
decreased by 1.91 units due to the campaign. Given the control mean of 6.39, this translates
into a 30 percent improvement. The effect on the severe depressive symptoms indicator is in
the same direction but not statistically significant (wild bootstrap p− value = 0.12).
We discuss two important caveats. First, the common trends assumption of the DID method
requires the treatment and comparison groups to be on similar trajectories prior to the anti-
corruption campaign. We are unable to assess this assumption of the DID methodology as we
only have mental health information in one pre-treatment wave of the VARHS data. Second,
another assumption of the DID analysis is that of non-interference, i.e., that the treatment
status of an observation does not affect the outcomes of other observations (also referred to as
the Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption or SUTVA). In the context of our analysis, this
may be violated if greater scrutiny in high corruption provinces led to a shift of corruption
activities to the low corruption provinces.12 Such spillovers would imply that the mental
12The differential effects appear to be driven by an improvement in ex-ante high corruption provinces:
the average corruption index in High corruption provinces falls from 0.63 to 0.38 between 2016 and 2018.
The index in low corruption provinces moves from 0.28 to 0.33 in the same time period.
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health in control provinces would be lower than otherwise. By narrowing the gap in the
CES-D index between treatment and control provinces, this could lead to an underestimate
of the overall effect of the anti-corruption program. Overall, these results provide suggestive
evidence that the anti-corruption campaign had meaningful positive effects on mental health.
While this analysis is preliminary in nature, the results are interesting and merit further
research.
5 Conclusion
This paper contributes to the limited literature examining the linkages between corruption
and mental health. First, using a cross-sectional sample of over 1,300 respondents across
22 provinces in rural Vietnam, we find strong evidence that day-to-day petty corruption
is positively associated with psychological distress. Second, we find similar results from a
panel data of non-farm household enterprise owners from 12 provinces in rural Vietnam.
These results are also robust to a variety of other checks. While our study does not make
a definitive claim of causality between corruption and mental health, the robustness of our
results indicates that daily stress factors like corruption are important determinants of mental
health in developing countries.
We also find that the relationship between corruption and mental health is stronger for
women. Given that women are often marginalised and have limited access to mental health
services, this indicates that concerted effects to insulate women from corruption can have
large payoffs. Furthermore, there is increasing evidence that welfare of children is closely
associated with the psychological well-being of their caregivers, who more likely to be women.
This implies that improving mental health of women can have broader impacts on society
by limiting intergenerational transmission of poor mental health.
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Fighting corruption remains high on the current policy agenda of the Vietnamese govern-
ment, as evidenced by the unprecedented anti-corruption campaign launched by CPV Gen-
eral Secretary in 2016. While reductions in economic costs and inefficiencies have long been
recognized as the potential benefits of efforts to mitigate corruption, the findings presented
here suggest that there may be large gains in mental health as well. To that end, we recom-
mend rigorous evaluations of psychosocial interventions in poor institutional settings.
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Figure 1: Relationship between mental health and different levels of corruption
Notes: Authors’ illustration based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) data.
Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10.
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Figure 2: Corruption and mental health: Quantile regression analysis
Notes: This figure shows results from quantile regressions of mental health on cor-
ruption using the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) data. The OLS results are
overlaid for comparison. All regressions include control variables listed in Panel C of
Table 1 and commune fixed effects.
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Table 1: Summary statistics
Mean SD
Panel A: Mental health outcomes
CES-D index 5.02 3.71
Severe Depressive Symptoms 0.12 0.32
Panel B: Corruption variables
Officials divert funds for private benefit 0.16 0.37
Bribes for land titles 0.28 0.45
Bribes in hospitals 0.32 0.47
Bribes to school teachers 0.25 0.44
Bribes for construction permits 0.20 0.40
Bribes for govt. jobs 0.37 0.48
Corruption index 1.59 1.77




Completed High School 0.54 0.50
Poor Household 0.08 0.27
Number of assets 9.04 2.60
Married 0.81 0.39
Observations 1318
Notes: This table is based on the Vietnam Social Capital Survey
(VSCS) data. The maximum possible score on CES-D index is 30.
Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10.
The maximum number of assets is 16. Poor household is an indica-
tor variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by
the government. Kinh is an indicator variable for the ethnic major-
ity group.
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Table 2: Corruption and mental health: VSCS data
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms CES-D Index
Severe Depressive
Symptoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.603∗∗∗ 0.024∗∗ 0.621∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗







Completed High School 0.192 -0.002
(0.217) (0.018)
Poor Household 0.817∗∗ 0.067∗
(0.373) (0.036)




Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oster test: δ -59.562 -11.092 -57.834 -7.794
Oster test: β 0.652 0.027 0.677 0.033
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indi-
cator for CES-D index ≥10. Poor household is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor
by the government. The lower panel reports δ and β based on the test prescribed by Oster (2019), with maximum R-
squared set at 1.3 times the R-squared from the regressions using controls. Standard errors clustered at the commune
level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 3: Corruption and mental health: VARHS Data
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms CES-D Index
Severe Depressive
Symptoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption costs (z-score) 0.453∗∗ 0.050∗∗
(0.197) (0.020)
Corruption dummy 0.920∗∗ 0.088∗∗
(0.378) (0.041)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Oster test: δ 6.187 8.993 7.489 10.446
Oster test: β 0.394 0.047 0.822 0.082
Mean of dep. var. 6.18 0.21 6.18 0.21
N 956 956 956 956
Notes: This table uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe Depressive Symptoms
is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. Corruption costs index ranges from 0 to 3. Corruption dummy is an indicator for
Corruption costs > 0. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household
poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. The lower panel reports
δ and β based on the test prescribed by Oster (2019), with maximum R-squared set at 1.3 times the R-squared from
the regressions using controls. Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at
10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 4: Corruption and mental health: Heterogeneity
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms CES-D Index
Severe Depressive
Symptoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.354∗∗ 0.022 0.613∗∗∗ 0.027∗∗
(0.155) (0.015) (0.096) (0.011)
Corruption index*Female 0.501∗ 0.011
(0.251) (0.023)
Corruption index*Poor 0.097 0.008
(0.361) (0.037)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indi-
cator for CES-D index ≥10. Controls include age, gender, education, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and
household poverty status. Poor is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by the gov-
ernment. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant
at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 5: Corruption and mental health: Pathways
Log Ent. Rev. Trust Locus of Control
(1) (2) (3)
Corruption costs (z-score) -0.088∗ -0.077∗∗ -0.070
(0.050) (0.037) (0.084)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 12.08 2.96 11.70
N 956 956 956
Notes: This table uses the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS)
data. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, marital
status, household poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters,
and illness/death shocks. Household enterprise revenue is reported in ‘000 VND and is
in real June 2017 prices. Standard errors clustered at household level are reported in
parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table 6: Anti-corruption campaign and mental health
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms
(1) (2)
High corruption*Post -1.907∗ -0.149
(1.057) (0.108)
Wild bootstrap p− value 0.08 0.12
Household controls Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Mean of control dep. var. 6.39 0.20
N 956 956
Notes: This table reports results of the difference-in-differences estimation
strategy described in Section 4.3 using the Vietnam Access to Resources
Household Survey (VARHS) data. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indi-
cator for CES-D index ≥10. High corruption is a dummy variable that takes
the value 1 if the average reported corruption in the province is above the
sample median in 2016. Post is an indicator for the post-treatment period
of 2018. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school comple-
tion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to
pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Standard errors clustered
at province level are reported in parentheses. The Wild bootstrap p− values
are according to the wild cluster bootstrap-t procedure of Cameron et al.
(2008). * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Corruption and mental health: Evidence from Vietnam
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1
Figure A1: Map of the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) study provinces
Source: Authors’ illustration.
2
Figure A2: Map of the Vietnam Access to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) provinces
Source: Authors’ illustration.
3
Figure A3: Density of CES-D score for the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) sample
Notes: The grey line at a CES-D score of 10 represents the threshold for severe depres-
sive symptoms.
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Table A1: Corruption statements
Statement
1 In my commune/ward, officials divert funds from the state budget for their personal benefit
2 People have to pay bribes in order to obtain a land title
3 People like me have to bribe to receive medical treatment in the district’s hospitals
4 Parents have to pay bribes to teachers for their children to be better attended at the primary
school nearest to my house
5 In my commune/ward, officials receive kickbacks in exchange for approval of construction permits
6 In order to get a job in the government, people have to pay a bribe
Notes: In the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS) respondents were asked how much they agreed with each of the six
presented statements on a 4-point scale where 1 meant ‘agree completely’, 2 meant ‘somewhat agree’, 3 meant ‘disagree’
and 4 meant ‘disagree completely’. For the main analysis we recode responses to each statement as 1 if the subject indi-
cates agreement and 0 otherwise, and then construct the individual-level corruption index as the sum of the responses to
these six statements.
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Table A2: CES-D Index questions
In the last 7 days ....
1 how often did you sleep well?
2 how often were you happy?
3 how often did you have trouble concentrating in what you were doing?
4 how often did you feel hopeful about the future?
5 how often did you feel that everything you did was an effort?
6 how often did you feel lonely?
7 how often did you feel depressed?
8 how often did you feel that you could not “get going”?
9 how often were you bothered by things that don’t usually bother you?
10 how often did you feel fearful?
Notes: Respondents were asked to indicate how often they had these feelings in the last
week on a four-scale metric - “never (0 days in a week)”, “sometimes (1-2 days of the week)”,
“often (3-4 days of the week)”, and “all the time (5-7 days of in a week)”. These responses
are coded from 0 to 3 respectively. The response scale is reversed for the positive questions,
so that they have the same sign as those negative questions.
6
Table A3: Comparison of VSCS sample with the VHLSS




High school education 0.54 0.27
Married 0.81 0.78
Kinh 0.93 0.95
Poor household 0.08 0.07
Observations 1344 6438
Notes: This table compares the Vietnam Social Capital Survey
(VSCS) sample characteristics with those in the Vietnam House-
hold and Living Standards Survey (VHLSS) 2016. The VHLSS
2016 figures are based on information collected from respondents
of rural communes in the same 22 provinces as the experimental
sample. The VHLSS did not collect information on the same assets
reported in Table 1. Poor household is an indicator variable for re-
spondent’s household being classified as poor by the government.
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Table A4: Summary statistics of VARHS data
2016 2018
Mean SD Mean SD
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Panel A: Mental health outcomes
CES-D index 6.94 4.22 5.42 3.81
Severe Depressive Symptoms 0.26 0.44 0.16 0.37
Panel B: Corruption variables
Corruption costs 0.50 0.69 0.36 0.59
Corruption dummy 0.40 0.49 0.31 0.46
Panel C: Control variables
Female 0.44 0.50 0.43 0.50
Age 50.74 12.74 51.61 12.71
Primary school education 0.87 0.33 0.79 0.41
Married 0.85 0.36 0.86 0.35
Poor household 0.06 0.23 0.02 0.15
Natural shock 0.07 0.26 0.05 0.22
Health shock 0.09 0.29 0.01 0.11
Pest attack 0.06 0.24 0.06 0.24
Observations 478 478
Notes: The maximum possible score on CES-D index is 30. Severe Depressive Symp-
toms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. Corruption costs index ranges from 0 to
3. Corruption dummy is an indicator for Corruption costs index >0. Poor house-
hold is an indicator variable for respondent’s household being classified as poor by
the government.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.099∗∗∗ 0.103∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗∗ -0.001 -0.030
(0.027) (0.023) (0.022) (0.027) (0.035)
Mean of dep. var. 0.64 0.48 0.69 0.50 0.91





(6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.083∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.120∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.021) (0.018) (0.016) (0.022) (0.023)
Mean of dep. var. 0.32 0.22 0.20 0.58 0.47
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, edu-
cation, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard errors clustered at the
commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A6: Robustness: alternative corruption measures
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms CES-D Index
Severe Depressive
Symptoms
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Contin. corruption index (z-score) 0.690∗∗∗ 0.040∗∗∗
(0.115) (0.012)
Corruption dummy 0.974∗∗∗ 0.046∗∗
(0.171) (0.018)
Female 0.647∗∗∗ 0.054∗∗∗ 0.623∗∗∗ 0.052∗∗∗
(0.168) (0.019) (0.172) (0.019)
Age 0.015 0.002∗∗ 0.013 0.002∗∗
(0.012) (0.001) (0.012) (0.001)
Kinh -0.220 0.015 -0.279 0.011
(0.678) (0.059) (0.694) (0.061)
Completed High School 0.215 -0.001 0.225 -0.001
(0.224) (0.018) (0.221) (0.018)
Poor Household 0.768∗∗ 0.064∗ 0.870∗∗ 0.070∗
(0.377) (0.036) (0.372) (0.036)
Number of assets -0.097∗ -0.008 -0.092 -0.007
(0.057) (0.005) (0.056) (0.005)
Married -1.346∗∗∗ -0.091∗∗∗ -1.284∗∗∗ -0.088∗∗∗
(0.305) (0.027) (0.307) (0.027)
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 0.12 5.02 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). In columns 1 and 2, corruption is a continuous
measure in the 6-24 range. In columns 3 and 4, corruption dummy takes the value 1 if the respondent expressed agreement with
any corruption statement and 0 otherwise. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CESD-10 index ≥10. Standard errors
clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A7: Detailed corruption measures and CES-D index
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Officials divert funds for private benefit 1.075∗∗∗
(0.290)
Bribes for land titles 0.750∗∗∗
(0.238)
Bribes in hospitals 0.850∗∗∗
(0.202)
Bribes to school teachers 0.990∗∗∗
(0.244)
Bribes for construction permits 0.776∗∗∗
(0.215)
Bribes for govt. jobs 1.036∗∗∗
(0.196)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02 5.02
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, education,
ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. The corruption variables are dummy variables
that take value 1 if the respondent indicates agreement and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the commune level
are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A8: Detailed corruption measures and Severe Depressive Symptoms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Officials divert funds for private benefit 0.060∗
(0.031)
Bribes for land titles 0.026
(0.026)
Bribes in hospitals 0.042∗∗
(0.019)
Bribes to school teachers 0.048∗
(0.026)
Bribes for construction permits 0.021
(0.022)
Bribes for govt. jobs 0.050∗∗
(0.020)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12 0.12
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). Controls include age, gender, educa-
tion, ethnicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an
indicator for CES-D index ≥10. The corruption variables are dummy variables that take value 1 if the respondent
indicates agreement and 0 otherwise. Standard errors clustered at the commune level are reported in parentheses.
* significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A9: Robustness check: including province time trends
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms
(1) (2)
Corruption costs (z-score) 0.255∗ 0.033∗∗
(0.154) (0.014)
Household controls Yes Yes
Province-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 6.18 0.21
N 956 956
Notes: This table uses data from the VARHS. Severe Depressive Symptoms
is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. Controls include respondent’s age, gen-
der, primary school completion, marital status, household poverty status, and
household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Stan-
dard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. * sig-
nificant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A10: Robustness check: including baseline variable interactions
CES-D Index Severe DepressiveSymptoms
(1) (2)
Corruption costs (z-score) 0.439∗∗ 0.051∗∗
(0.199) (0.020)
Household controls Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Year Dummies*Baseline HH poverty and ethnicity Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 6.18 0.21
N 956 956
Notes: This table uses data from the VARHS. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D in-
dex ≥10. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household
poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Standard
errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at
5%,*** significant at 1%.
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Table A11: Robustness check: comparison with unbalanced panel
Balanced Sample Unbalanced Sample





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Corruption costs (z-score) 0.453∗∗ 0.050∗∗ 0.343∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗ 0.343∗∗∗ 0.041∗∗∗
(0.197) (0.020) (0.156) (0.014) (0.112) (0.011)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Household Fixed Effects Yes Yes No No No No
Province Fixed Effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
P − value : βHH FE = βnoHH FE 0.66 0.72
P − value : βbalanced = βunbalanced 0.63 0.69
Mean of dep. var. 6.18 0.21 6.18 0.21 6.54 0.23
N 956 956 956 956 1607 1607
Notes: This table uses data from the VARHS. Severe Depressive Symptoms is an indicator for CES-D index ≥10. Columns 1 and 2 are the same as the results shown in
columns 1 and 2 of Table 3. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, marital status, household poverty status, and household exposure to
pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Standard errors clustered at the household level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,***
significant at 1%.
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Table A12: VARHS Data: Corruption and attrition
HH not observed
in 2018
HH not observed in 2018 because ...
did not operate enterprise in 2018 missing in 2018
(1) (2) (3)
Corruption costs (z-score) -0.023 -0.023 -0.001
(0.014) (0.014) (0.004)
Household controls Yes Yes Yes
Province Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Mean of dep. var. 0.48 0.46 0.02
N 920 920 920
Notes: This table reports the relationship between attrition and exposure to corruption in 2016 using the Vietnam Ac-
cess to Resources Household Survey (VARHS) data. The sample consists of households operating an enterprise in 2016.
The outcome in col. 1 is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the household was not observed operating an enter-
prise in 2018. The outcome in col. 2 is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the household was in the 2018 survey
but did not operate an enterprise. The outcome in col. 3 is an indicator variable that takes value 1 if the household was
not observed in 2018 survey wave. Controls include respondent’s age, gender, primary school completion, marital status,
household poverty status, and household exposure to pests, natural disasters, and illness/death shocks. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
16
Table A13: Corruption and mental health: quantile regression analysis
10th 25th 50th 75th 90th
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Corruption index (z-score) 0.224∗∗∗ 0.532∗∗∗ 0.640∗∗∗ 0.727∗∗∗ 0.644∗∗∗
(0.085) (0.107) (0.099) (0.155) (0.189)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Commune Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1318 1318 1318 1318 1318
Notes: This table uses data from the Vietnam Social Capital Survey (VSCS). The outcome
variable in all the columns is the CES-D index. Controls include age, gender, education, eth-
nicity, marital status, household assets, and household poverty status. Standard errors clus-
tered at the commune level are reported in parentheses. * significant at 10%,** significant at
5%,*** significant at 1%.
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